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DONALD POLLOCK initial question; whether or not this approach convinces us that the ritual transformation of identity resolves or reproduces social issues, it fails to account for the effectiveness of masks in producing such outcomes. The psychoanalytic variant of this approach suffers from the same limitation. Ottenberg's suggestion that features of Afikpo masking ritual 'allow the performance to publicly, in symbolic form, deal with commonly held repressed materials which themselves characteristically refer to early life' (Ottenberg 1983 : 225) at best commits the familiar psychoanalytic confusion of cause with effect and means with ends. The second type of approach may appear bizarre to a social anthropological audience. Webber et aL (1983) , among others, have focused on the narrowly psychological effects of the mask, in an effort to relate the use of masks to personality integration, for example through hypothesized links between unconscious mental processes and neural and cortical structures. If the first approach ignores the question of how masks work, this second takes it up with a vengeance, but in so doing it ignores the cultural and social contexts in which masks function.
Moreover, this latter view is based on the assumption that masks produce their effects on persons by operating on the face. Tonldn, for example, calls the face 'the personality's most immediate mis en scene' (1979: 241), just as, for Levi-Strauss, the significance of the mask, as of facial decoration, lies in the fact that the face is 'the three dimensional surface par excellence ' (1963: 262; c? Mair 1975) . Although this emphasis on the face hints at a more productive view of masks as iconic, rather than symbolic, it introduces assumptions about both the face and the mask that I will challenge here. In the meantime, we may note that other techniques than masks and other sites than faces are used to transform identity and personhood, or to signal such transformations. The range of body techniques and the variety of mask styles and uses is too great to privilege the simple stereotype.
Again, the alternative proposal I want to pursue here is the suggestion that masks 'work' by operating upon the particular ways in which identity, or personhood, is expressed in any culture. The mask works by concealing or modifying those signs of identity which conventionally display the actor, and by presenting new values that, again conventionally, represent the transformed person or an entirely new identity. Although every culture may recognize numerous media through which identity may be presented, masks achieve their special effect by modifring those limited number of conventionalized signs of identity.
A simple example of this kind of conventionalization can be drawn from Western culture. We are, at least according to Goffman (1959) , continually engaged in the process of impression management, the maintenance of an identity and its presentation through a complex coordination of multiple signs, from speech style (and content) and dress, to the objects with which we surround ourselves. Yet, during those ritual occasions when we are called upon to wear a mask, we are able to signal that the disguise of our identities is taking place through the use of a simple, small eye-covering mask of the sort familiar at traditional masked balls. Note that this minimal mask signals the disguise of identity; in reality it may fail to conceal the identity of the wearer, but its success depends upon the familiar kind of suspension of disbelief through which the 'theatre effect' is achieved. One can specify even further that this theatre effect is achieved to the extent that the mask, however minimal, modifies the conventional signs that signal changes in identity. In this example, the use and specific form of the mask derives from the significance of the eyes in Western culture as the conventionalized sign par excellence of identity. As Seeger noted in his study of Suyl facial decoration (1975), Westerners say, for example, that the eyes are the window on the soul, that seeing is believing, look someone in the eyes to gauge their honesty or true worth. In such cultures 'seeing' is equated with 'understanding.' The minimal Western mask works, not by concealing the face, but by concealing the eyes.4 We might note that in Western cultures it is typically a costume that displays transformed identity, not the mask (or the face?).
Gell's analysis of masks in the Umeda ida ritual offers an illustration of this relationship between masks and persons. Gell proposes that the elaborate masks used in this ritual cycle are, in essence, analogues of the means -such as hair styles -through which social status is expressed in everyday life. Umeda masks, and their associated body paintings, are thus effective as signs of transformed identity precisely because they replace the conventional signs through which identity is displayed among Umeda.
I will pursue these points with more extended ethnographic examples: the Kwakiutl Indians of the northwest coast of British Columbia, and the Kulina Indians of western Brazil. I have chosen these cases for several reasons. First, Northwest Coast art, and in particular masks, are spectacular in design and decoration. Masks were a constant feature of Kwakiutl ritual, and I will suggest that the masking principle permeated other aspects of Kwakiutl culture as well. Moreover, Boas has left a large corpus of ethnography to cannibalize, enough to produce relatively satisfying secondary analyses.5 Indeed, my already long section on the Kwakiutl could have been extended considerably. I also draw on two important secondary analyses of Boas's work, by Goldman (1975) and Walens (1981; . Second, the Kulina example offers a case of a complex masking tradition, combining several styles of masks, all of which nonetheless conform to the essential semiotic principles that underlie Kwakiutl masking, and which draw upon the indexical potential of these various media of identity display.
The Kwakiutl: identity and iconicity
Kwakiutl6 social organization appears to have alternated between two forms, the first comprising summer villages composed of descent groups called numayma (or numema), the second comprising winter villages composed of Dancing Societies whose membership cut across the numayms. I consider these in turn.
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The numayma was a condensed form of descent group, the core of which was of a fixed size, limited by a set of names (originally of ancestral beings) of which it was composed (Boas 1966: 50). Commoners were not full members, inasmuch as they had no rights or duties in the quintessential corporate activities of the group, especially potlatches. The names, or titles, were accompanied by what Boas called 'crests,' apparently on analogy with heraldry. In fact, crests generally were masks carved of wood. These masks, and the names associated with them, were imbued with the mystical nature of the founding ancestors of the numayma, the souls of these animal founders, as Goldman put it (1975: 241, n.7). Quite simply, the process of transmitting these names and masks imbued the new possessor with the spiritual identity or begwanemgemtl of the ancestor.7 Thus, any contemporary numayma was in essence a living and exact representation or incarnation of the original, ancestral numayna. As such, the term 'descent group' may not be the appropriate one, for the rights and duties, jural and moral imperatives of membership in the numayma derived neither from the parents nor from a descent tie to an ancestor, but rather from the incorporation of the ancestors' identities into the constituent members of the numayma through possession of the names and associated masks of those ancestors.8
Kwakiutl myth neatly expresses both how these names came into existence, and how their associated masks 'work.' In myth, the original animal ancestors shed their skins and emerged as human beings. The skins became the masks later associated with the name of the ancestor. Each works, so to speak, by hiding the human person in the skin, or mask, transforming the wearer into the ancestor. This signalling technique was replicated in at least two other ways. First, many Kwakiutl masks open to reveal a second mask underneath. The person was, in effect, a series of layers, the outermost of which was displayed but which could be shed to reveal another identity-layer underneath (c? Postal 1965). The outer layer displayed one's public identity, the public 'person', while the innermost core was one's 'soul' or spiritual identity. The mask associated with one's name displayed a form of one's identity. Second, Kwakiutl potlatches involved the transfer of wealth when names were given from parent to child. The basic standard of wealth was what Boas called 'blankets', but which were traditionally animal skins. These animal skins were thus 'masks', the outer layer masks of various animals. They complemented the ranked name 'mask' by establishing a relation of species to individual (or type to token); the animal ancestor of the numayma and his animal descendants whose skins were given away, and the animal ancestor of the numayma and his human descendants who received his begwanemgemtl or spiritual identity. Thus, the original ancestor created two kinds of mask: the first was the name-mask which humans wore. Men were brought into relation with animals in this way; humans exchanged animal skins, and when human animal hunters died, their 'souls' were incorporated into living animals. It is worth noting, parenthetically, that Locher, in his early study (1932), placed the two-headed sisiulth snake at the centre of Kwakiutl religion. Snakes are possessors of particular mystical power for Kwakiutl, since they combine characteristics which play upon the themes of identity that inform masking. For example, snakes swallow food whole and alive. Rather than putting on the skin-mask of deceased animals, the snake surrounds a living animal with its own skin. The snake, in effect, wears its inner layer on the outside, and appears to incorporate other animals into its 'soul', its most interior being. Moreover, a snake sheds its skin, but emerges untransformed, a kind of living mask that remains unchanged while the beings within it change.
There is one additional interesting feature of numayma masks that should be mentioned: as far as I am able to determine from the literature, they were not actually worn. They were an external receptacle for the ancestral spirit, a material icon of the ancestor's identity. It is the iconic relationship between the receptacle form and the form of the body-enclosing-a-spirit and its transforming property that was critical, not the specific use of the object. Some of the objects that accompanied names were not stereotypical masks at all -thus Boas's more inclusive term 'crests' or kis'u -but nonetheless relied upon the same semiotic logic to achieve their effect, drawing upon the iconicity of receptacles in the display of identity. Indeed, the receptacle form might be said to comprise the primary semiotic field for personhood among the Kwakiutl, the material forms of which were manipulated to fashion masks, boxes and clothing, as well as human persons themselves. Walens uses the images of the box to offer the rather structuralist suggestion that 'boxness forms the metaphorical basis in Kwakiutl philosophy for ideas of kinship and separateness, space and time, cooperation and competition, secularity and sacredness, self and other, life and death, and innumerable other dialectic oppositions ..
. Even the human body is a kind of box' (1981: 46).
A number of mythological creatures assisted numayma ancestors, and often this relationship was the source of masks, names and other gifts to those ancestors. Hataqa, for example, a daughter of Raven, was abandoned by her numayma for a breach of social etiquette. She made a fish basket and later discovered in it a son of Qomoqoa, protector of seals. She married this son, and he became an ancestor of the numayma. In this myth, as in others, the ancestor emerged from a vessel or receptacle, the fish basket.
One creature in particular appears to have been among the ancestral helpers of all numayma. This is the dzonokwa (also tsonoqua), the 'wild woman of the woods', a tribe of wild creatures which are usually represented as women. In a long series of myths common to virtually all numayma, a dzonokwa assists, and even marries, the numayma ancestor, who receives from the wild woman such gifts as a self-paddling canoe, the water of life which can revive the dead, and the death-bringer, often a stick which can be pointed at a victim with fatal effect. The dzonokwa was a special source of the ultimate power of chiefs, the control of life and death. It appears that there was a male dzonokwa as well; he was the younger brother of the 'winter ceremony' cannibal, Man Eater. Thus, the mythic roles of the Man Eater cannibal and his younger brother dzonokwa were replicated in the positions of the avatars of the two creatures in contemporary numayma: younger brothers were said to be the warriors for their chiefly older brothers, and thus the chief was warrior for his 'older brother' Man Eater. This same chief would become possessed by the cannibal during the winter ceremony.
The dzonokwa are quite distinctive, with large, protruding features, especially the lips, pushed out as if making their characteristic 'oooh' call. Many Kwakiutl masks are differentiated by their mouths. For Kwakiutl, it was the mouth that gave access to the soul and which served as the link between the exterior identity and the interior soul. Kwakiutl masks were thus often designed to signal the fundamental differences at the core of souls, even when public identity was similar. Although Kwakiutl masks were often accompanied by highly elaborated costumes (cf Gunther 1971: 333), one can speculate, on analogy with the Western minimal mask, that the comparable conventionalized icon of identity would focus on the mouth. While there are no specific data addressing this question, a couple of hints are offered. First, the interface between the human world and that of mystical spirit beings was called the Mouth of Heaven. Second, Boas mentioned the use of cedar bark around the mouth in ritual; he was unable to conceive of this as a mask, of course, but the use of cedar bark to signify ritual transformation is well-known among the Kwakdutl. Members of the Seal Dancing Societies wore masks associated with names which could be inherited across numayma, and like numayma names these names comprised a fixed set of titles or statuses that functioned as transformable identities in ritual. Indeed, the masks worn by Seals in winter rituals caused spirit possession that only members of the Sparrow Dancing Society were able to cure. In the summer, numayma members acquired the identities of numayma ancestors through masks; in the winter, Seal Dancing Society members acquired the identities of harmful spirits: War, the cannibal hamat'sa, Fools and dangerous animals.
Dancing Society masks 'worked' in a semiotic sense in the same manner as all Kwakiutl masks, by serving as the outer layer that signalled the identity of the spirit, and simultaneously signalled the incorporation of the spirit into the mask-receptacle wearer. The masks of the numayma ancestors were not always highly elaborated, artistically or functionally. The masks of the winter ritual spirits, however, were often very complex masks representing a high level of technical craft and artistic skill.
Possession by the hamat'sa cannibal spirit was the most dramatic form of winter ritual masking, and provides a kind of token for the entire type of masking ritual. The person who was to become possessed went into the woods, where he was possessed by the spirits whose mask he owned. Those remaining in the village danced to attract the possessed person back, though the hamat'sas, the highest-ranked cannibal spirits, were said to remain in the woods for several months. Ultimately they returned to the village, shouting 'eat, eat, eat,' running in a frenzy through the village, chasing and biting people before they could be calmed and finally released from their possession.9
Kwakiutl ethnohistory posits that actual cannibalism occurred in the ritual, before the imposition of Western restrictions. The form of this cannibalism was neatly consistent with the semiotics of identity and masking that organized masking in other Kwakiutl domains. The 'healers' -the heliga -prepared a corpse of a dead relative of a hamat'sa cannibal by soaking it in salt water. Twigs were pushed under the skin of the corpse to scrape away the decaying flesh, leaving only the skin. The kingalalala, 'procurer of dead bodies for the hamat'sa', brought the body to a ceremonial house where the hamat'sa himself smoked the skin over a fire. All the hamat'sas shared the 'body' in a collective feast, after which they retired to a beach where they were washed with salt water. This salt water bath, finally, cured their possession.
The masks of winter ritual possession preserve the semiotic strategies of numayma masks, but with interesting inversions. For example, the hamat'sa cannibals did not simply wish to eat humans, but to incorporate their identities. But the hamat'sas were dangerous because they mistakenly inverted the process by which this incorporation of identities took place; rather than wearing the skin of the deceased -as in other masks, skins, 'blankets', and so on -the hamat'sas ate the skin, much as the mystically dangerous sisiulth snake envelops its victim rather than enveloping itself with the skin of the victim. 'Taming' the hamat'sa reverted to the proper form of masking: the naked hamat'sa was covered with the skins of animals that pacified him, and was finally tamed by salt water baths which washed away any remaining external sources of possession. Finally, one might note that the form of Kwakiutl art known as 'split representation' of the face, found frequently on masks and other receptacles, offers another convenient example of the masking principle. The split representation style on two-dimensional objects consists of the depiction of the face (or even of the whole animal) as though the top and back of the head or body had been split, and the face had been laid flat onto a surface, quite unlike a full-face portrait. The style was said by Levi-Strauss to express 'a deeper and more fundamental splitting, namely that between the dumb biological individual and the social person whom he must embody' (1963: 259). The argument I have been pursuing here suggests that L6vi-Strauss's emphasis on the distinction between the 'biological individual' and the social person was less incorrect than tangential to the masking function, and that such a representational style may be understood in terms of a simpler set of semiotic principles. For the Kwaldutl, split representation may be viewed as the imposition on a receptacle or container of the whole animal or creature depicted, as though the artist had stretched the skin of the animal over the object (cf Boas 1955: 250 sqq.). The style of representation is thus a variation on Kwakiutl semiotics of identity; through this style the identification of the animal and the object become complete, almost as though the object was wearing the mask, or was possessed by, the animal. . Rather, my intention has been to suggest that, whatever Kwakiutl masks mean in any particular case, this semantic effect is achieved by manipulating the semiotic media that conventionally display identity. In this instance, the semiotic field is the receptacle form, and the basic distinction between the two physical forms of masks -the face mask and the chest mask -replicates the indexical properties of 'outside' versus 'inside' or container/contained possessed by the receptacle form. The conclusion that Kwakiutl masks work by being receptacles, despite its apparent simplicity, suggests how one might make sense of a wider variety of techniques for transforming identity -from baths to blankets -and conversely how a wide variety of receptacles -from boxes to bodies -acquire the potential to function as masks.
I have said little in regard to what Kwakiutl masks signify, or to what the meaning of masks might be. This is not due to any semantic insufficiency in
7The Kulina: identity and indexicality
The second example which I discuss is from my own fieldwork with a group of Kulina Indians in western Amazonia. They provide a revealing contrast to the Kwakiutl in several respects, not the least of which is that they do not use masks in the sense of physical objects that cover the face or head. Nonetheless, they perform masking rituals of a particularly powerful sort, and I use their example to argue, again, that the form taken by masks is motivated, so to speak, by their particular semiotics of identity.
The Kulina masking, in the minimal sense, therefore draws upon the iconic and especially the indexical potential of these verbal media. First, masking rituals are performed at night, when visual cues to identity are extinguished or are irrelevant. The major masking ritual is the tokorime, the curing ritual during which shamans take on the identities of various spirit animals who are said to enter the village to cure a sick person. During the tokorime, shamans usually adopt palm frond costumes that cover their bodies from head to foot, but these are unnecessary, and shamans often perform curing rituals without them; their function is to hide or disguise rather than to reveal, and the disguising function is not necessary to achieve the theatre effect of the ritual. Rather, the minimal mask adopted by shamans is song, the special songs of the spirit animals represented. These songs present both the sounds and imagery that characterize the animal. During the ritual, shamans emerge from the forest, singing in the voice of the spirit they represent; village members hear the shamans singing as they dance into the village, and shout out the name of the animal spirit, or jokingly make the sounds characteristic of the animal, the grunting of peccaries or the call of a particular bird (see Pollock 1992 ). The effect is entirely aural, a rich complex of songs and sounds in which style and imagery combine to signal the transformation of shamans into spirits, and in which the transformed identity of the shamans is expressed. My point is not merely that songs represent these spirits by being like the conventional sounds of particular spirits or by singing a description of actions or qualities which an audience recognizes as the actions or qualities of particular spirits; masks, as I said earlier, are not simply kinds of pictures, even aural pictures. Rather, my point is that because verbal performance is the primary conventional medium for indexing identity among Kulina, verbal performance is also, in semiotic terms, the appropriate channel for the indexing of transformed identity
The curing ritual is the most elaborate context in which songs signal the kind of transformed identity that masking achieves. Music in general is a special variety of speech for Kulina, an aural medium not different from normal speech in kind, only in quality. As such, music alone can comprise a medium for a comparable sort of presentation of identity, for example by adolescent boys, who play small flutes 'to make themselves beautiful' to adolescent girls; at the same time, it appears that the continuous playing in public is also a sign, an index, of the liminal nature of adolescence among the Kulina. The ayahuasca ritual has a comparable quality for the Kulina. Participants gather at night to consume a hallucinogenic brew, which releases the individual spirit, the kurime, to fly up into the sky and commune with other spirits. The process is signalled entirely through song, first as one's own kurime sings, and later as other spirits sing. This chorus is striking, as each kurime, and each spirit, is indexed by different songs that participants in the ritual all sing simultaneously, in a stylized, high-pitched register.
While the Kulina, in common with other lowland Amazonian groups, use facial and body decorative techniques to display social status as well as liminality (c? Turner 1993; Seeger 1975), speech and hearing are the critical conventional media for the acquisition and display of identity, and thus of masking. If Kulina do not use the traditional kind of masks familiar from museum displays, it is because they do not conventionally regard the face as a privileged site upon 592 DONALD POLLOCK which identity is inscribed.11 Like the Kwakiutl, Kulina regard the body's surface as a whole as a site for the transformation of identity. Moving from the minimal form masks take in song, to the more elaborated forms of identity transformation comparable to costuming, Kulina believe smells to have special transformative properties, in particular, those smells that derive from plants found in the wild. During daytime rituals, Kulina adorn themselves with plants, especially with leaves, not for the visual effect but for the olfactory effect. Good smells transform wild and dangerous men into tame and sociable village members. The best smells are said to make men sexually attractive, and a wife may object when her husband places a sprig of a particularly powerful plant under his belt before leaving the village, suspecting him of seeking out an adulterous affair. Corpses, too, are rubbed with 'good' smelling leaves or other substances, to help render the deceased less dangerous to the remaining relatives. The worst smells have the opposite effect, turning sociable people into dangerous animals, in the worst cases poisoning them. Indeed, the logic of Kulina illness and curing also calls upon the transformative power of smells, both the disgusting smells that may cause illness and the good-smelling leaves that are placed on an infected area to cure it.
I will not pursue this Kulina example further. The point it illustrates should be apparent, that just as the expression of identity calls upon certain culturally ordered semiotic media, so too the masking of identity, whether in its disguise or substitution, can only take place through those same semiotic media. The mask, in this sense, is no more (and no less) enigmatic than conventional, everyday representations of identity.
I have stressed at several points the convention in masking as a semiotic process, and it should be emphasized that by this term I am not referring to the Saussurean notion of an arbitrary or conventional relationship between masks as signifiers and the signified meaning which they may be held to convey. On the contrary, one of the important insights of Peirce's general theory of signs is that, from within the perspective of any culture (or language), many, perhaps most, signs are of a sort that appear to bear a non-arbitrary relation to that to which they refer. Thus, icons and indexes are motivated as signs precisely by the special kinds of similarity which they hold to that which they signify. The common thermometer is a sign of temperature -an index -in regard to the cultural-linguistic view that temperature rises and falls. Rising and falling may be arbitrary ways of conceiving changes in temperature -'density' might come closer to a Brownian motion theory of heat -but given the cultural metaphor, the use of rising and falling levels of mercury to represent temperature is not at all arbitrary.
Rather, what I mean by conventionality in the use of masks is the common ethnographic claim that impersonations require a wilful suspension of disbelief among performers and audience, and that some conventional sign(s) must be available to alert performers and audience that impersonation is taking place. Masking is, from this perspective and not surprisingly, an aspect of the theatre effect through which audiences and performers temporarily collude in the pretence that on-stage events and characters are not unreal. Wagner makes much of this fact in his study of Daribi religion: 'The impersonation of divine or ghostly beings through a "transformation"$ constitutes the central feature of many religious systems ... For all the sanctity of such impersonations, and for all the stress that is laid on their metaphoric "validity", they must, nevertheless, remain impersonations' (Wagner 1972: 172) . Ortiz, in his study of rituals of personhood among the Tewa, for example, notes that immediately after the 'Finishing' ritual undergone by boys, the new initiates are taken to an inner room of the kiva, where the masked gods of the ritual reveal themselves to be relatives and neighbours (1969: 42-3). In this regard, at least, masking might be distinguished from possession. Spirit possession and masking represent different points along a continuum of techniques of identity display and transformation, but have in common that they both rely for their effectiveness upon semiotic processes that reveal not only what is displayed, but also that display is taking place. A thorough discussion of possession is beyond the rather modest scope of this article, but it is worth commenting briefly upon some of the semiotic similarities and differences between possession and masking, particularly as forms of both Kwakiutl and Kulina masking may appear to resemble possession more than masking in the strict sense of traditional taxonomies.
If the mask is an icon of identity, and an index of the identity transformation taking place, it is also a sign of the conventionality of the transformation, in the sense mentioned above: a sign of a sign, or of signalling. Possession, on the other hand, requires for its performance that the metadiscursive message be precisely the opposite, that possession be real in a sense that masking need not be. Any conventionality in the performance of possession potentially detracts from its power. Levi-Strauss took up a variation on this problem in his classic article on Quesalid, the Kwakiutl shaman who was unable to suspend his own disbelief in the literal reality of his magic, and was thus crippled as a shaman (1963: 175-8). The semiosis of possession, then, demands the use of media that are especially compelling, though the achievement of verisimilitude in performance may, paradoxically, be more effective through the mundane and ordinary semiotic media of identity display than through the more extraordinary semiotic media of masking. Thus, the metacommunicative intent of such practices as stabbing oneself with a kris while possessed, or walking over hot coals, is likely to be that of announcing, indeed fairly insisting upon, the reality of the experience, while the use of masks points to exactly the opposite. Note, for example, the comment by the Leacocks that the use of masks was strictly forbidden in the Brazilian Umbanda possession rituals they studied (1972), as if the use of masks would imply a kind of conventionality inconsistent with the veracity necessary for the possession experience to be authentic. Possession, like masking, has been examined extensively from various traditional anthropological perspectives, including its social functions for the possessed (Harris 1957; Lewis 1971) , the psychological nature of the experience (Bourguignon 1973; , and its psychological functions (e.g. Lewis 1971: 178-205; Obeyesekere 1977). As in the case of masking, little attention has been paid to the manner in which possession achieves the effect of signalling that so profound a transformation of identity is taking, or has taken, place. Perhaps the nearest to such a treatment of possession is the discussion of trance that often accompanies analyses of the phenomenon. Bourguignon, for example, notes that 'possession trance is behaviour, culturally patterned, occurring within acceptable cultural limits ' (1975: 46) , developing according to predictable patterns as individuals learn to trance. As such, trance offers itself as a convenient sign, a semiotic display that is compelling in ways that masking might not be. This seems particularly true when one considers how shallow trance can be. Kulina shamans, for example, go into trance during a curing ritual, assisted by the use of tobacco snuff Yet in the midst of their entranced spirit possession, singing in the high, nasal register of the tokorime spirits, they can occasionally be overheard directing an irritated comment sotto voce at a sniffing dog or a child who has wandered too close. Here, perhaps, the process of entry into trance must be read as a semiotic performance that offers a kind of index of the transformation taking place.
Conclusion
The assumption that the mask has some special ability to effect this transformation in identity apart from its semiotic potential, a hypothetical property of masks and masking that must be accounted for in the extraordinary terms of social paradox, personality integration, or neural networks, rests upon a prior or implicit assumption that identity is somehow given, inhering in individual actors, fixed, invariant, and which normal modes of identity-presentation simply display but do not create. In this regard, the first problem of the mask is the problem of identity in general, in its social and cultural construction, attribution, display and transformation: the process of continuous meaning construction that Peirce called 'semiosis. ' The problem of the mask, I have suggested, is that masks are not simply pictures, and their effects are not the effects of pictures. While anthropologists, archaeologists and art historians have devoted considerable attention to the representational meaning of masks (e.g. Markman & Markman 1989), or to the social functions of masking, such analyses focus only on the representational functions masks may perform, in common with a wide variety of other representational media, from art to body decoration. I hope that I have suggested here that masks are interesting precisely because they are more than merely representational media. Masks are not simply pictures of the spirits, animals or other beings they represent (when, indeed, they do represent); masks are also and simultaneously icons and indexes of identity, and it is this conjunction of semiotic functions and fields that give the mask its particular form in any society and its particular fascination for anthropology.
NOTES
This article grew out of a paper presented to the seminar 'Ritual and Personhood' convened by Grace Harris at the University of Rochester in 1978; I am grateful to Professor Harris for advice and assistance in the conception of this article, and want to stress that she is not responsible for the excessive length of its gestation. A more recent draft was read at anthropology departmental colloquia at Boston University in 1988, at which Robert Hefner and Jane Guyer made very useful suggestions, and at Bryn Mawr College in 1995. I am grateful to Dr Hastings Donnan and Aaron Glass for advice helpful in the preparation of the final draft. I Peirce's analysis of sign-types is complex, and any elaboration would take me far beyond the limits of this article. Convenient, anthropologically relevant summaries of Peirce's classification of signs may be found in Daniel (1984) and Rochberg-Halton (1986).
